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Abstract
We ran an experiment with children to study the development of honesty with
age. We asked each child to toss a fair coin in private and to record the outcome
(white or black) in a paper sheet. We rewarded only who reported white. We found a
fraction of reported whites signicantly larger than 50%, uniformly across age groups.
This suggests that some children cheat when cheating is protable and they are not
observed. In a second treatment we told children not to cheat. This reminder reduced
the probability of reporting white by 18% on average, and signicantly more in girls.
Keywords: honesty; children; eld experiment.
JEL codes: C93; J13.
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In everyday life we observe dishonesty. People ride the bus without buying a ticket, do
not pay their taxes and illegally download music from the Internet. Unfortunately, these
examples are only a subset of the possible cases of dishonest behavior. As argued in Mazar
and Ariely (2006), dishonest actions are socially costly as they "contribute to the U.S.
economy losing hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenues, wages, and investment dollars,
as well as hundreds of thousands of jobs each year." On the other hand, there are many
economic activities that operate on an honor system. For instance, at an airport, all luggage
is placed on a common conveyor belt and it is assumed that passengers will only claim their
own; or some hotels allow guests to serve and record their own drinks. This heterogeneity
of behavior is surprising.
An extensive experimental literature studies dishonesty in economics (Fischbacher and
Heusi, 2008; Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2008; Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2007) and psychology
(Polak and Harris, 1999; Wilson, Smith and Ross, 2003). Concurrently, the behavior of
children in di¤erent situations is increasingly being studied, with a growing body of literature
in experimental economics having emerged over the last few years (see for instance Fehr,
Bernhard and Rockenback, 2008; Harbaugh, Krause and Berry, 2001; Harbaugh, Krause
and Vesterlund, 2002 and 2007). However, to the best of our knowledge the development of
honest and dishonest behavior with age has not yet been studied. This paper takes a step
towards addressing this issue, by reporting data from a eld experiment with children.
We ran a eld experiment in an Italian summer camp, which allowed us to observe
a large number of children who di¤ered in age and other demographic characteristics. Our
sample includes nearly 200 observations, encompassing children between the ages of 5 and 15.
In a rst experiment we asked children to toss a fair coin, which was white on one side and
black on the other, and to report the result. Children only received a prize if they reported
the white outcome. If everyone were to report honestly, we should observe a roughly equal
distribution between white and black outcomes. However, the toss was not observed, so each
child could easily cheat.1 If cheating had no internal cost, it would therefore be convenient
for all children to report the white outcome. In our sample 85% of the children reported
the white outcome. This fraction is statistically larger than 50% and smaller than 100%.
This suggests that: i) some children cheat when the environment allows them to do so; ii)
other children are honest even if this behavior is costly. The tendency to cheat is statistically
signicant in all sub-groups based on age, gender, school performance, number of siblings,
and body mass index (hereafter BMI), but is more pronounced in older children and those
with siblings. In a second experiment we repeated the same game with other children, but
we explicitly reminded them not to cheat. On average this reminder reduces the probability
of reporting the white outcome by 18%. The e¤ect of this reminder was signicantly larger
in girls.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section I we sketch the experiment. In Section II
we present our results and in Section III we draw our conclusions. The appendix provides
details on the experiment.
I. The Experiment
We conducted an experiment with young children at the CUS Summer Camp of Padua
(Italy), over two days in July 2008.2 The experiment took place outdoors, and the partici-
pants perceived the task as being one of the typical camp activities. We explained the game
rules individually to each child, ensuring they fully understood before playing. In the game
we asked each child to step behind a wall, toss a fair coin, which was white on one side and
black on the other, and to report the result. Only children who reported white received a
prize. Children in our sample were of di¤erent ages, and we needed an experimental currency
that would be desirable for everybody. We did not use monetary rewards as a number of
works nd money inhibits cheating (see Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2007). We therefore gave a
prize of 5 tokens to those who reported the white outcome. At the end of the day, children
exchanged their tokens at the summer camps clubhouse, choosing from a menu of snacks,
beverages and ice cream. We privately agreed with the summer camp on an exchange rate
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of 50 eurocents for the prize.
Importantly, children were not observed during their toss. Hence, they could easily
cheat and report the white outcome even if the result of their toss was black. Although
we are not able to tell whether each child was honest, we can estimate the honesty of the
children as a whole group, by comparing the observed fraction of reported white outcomes
with the expected 50 percent.
During the two days we ran two treatments of the game with di¤erent children. In
the Control Treatment (CT), we carefully avoided mentioning the possibility of cheating,
but at the same time, we did not explicitly tell the children not to cheat. In the Reminder
Treatment (RT), we explicitly told them not to cheat. We did so both orally during the
game explanation, and in writing, by adding the sentence "DO NOT CHEAT!" ("NON
IMBROGLIARE!" in Italian) to the reporting sheet. Children in the RT thus lled in the
reporting sheet b) rather than a) in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
a) Reporting sheet in CT. b) Reporting sheet in RT.
We received permission to run the experiment from the manager and the instructors of
the summer camp. A few days before the experiment, we also asked parents for their consent
along with some basic information about each child (age, gender, school performance, number
of siblings, height, weight).3 Based on a consent rate of 83.88 percent, our nal dataset
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comprises 182 children aged 5 to 15 years.4 Table 1 reports the average characteristics of
the children in the CT and RT groups; the two samples are approximately equal in size with
similar demographic characteristics.5
Table 1. Average sample statistics
Whole sample CT RT
% Reported white outcomes 76.92 85.39 68.82
Age 8.79 9.16 8.33
% Girls 28.02 27.55 28.72
% Excellent at school 41.76 47.96 37.23
Number of siblings 0.93 0.97 0.86
Body Mass Index (BMI) 16.78 17.33 16.05
Observations 182 89 93
II. Results
Our ndings can be summarized by three main results, the rst of which is as follows:
Result 1. Many (but not all) children cheat. The tendency to cheat is observed uni-
formly in any sub-group based on age, gender, school performance, number of siblings, or
BMI, but is less frequent in younger children and in children without siblings.
Overall, 76.92% of the children reported a white outcome with a 95% binomial condence
interval of (70.11%, 82.83%). Table 2 shows the percentage of reported white outcomes by
sub-groups, with binomial condence intervals in round brackets.
Since the coin is fair, one would expect the condence interval to include 50%. The
percentage in our sample is instead statistically above 50%, both for the whole sample as
well as for smaller sub-groups dened according to age, gender, school performance, number
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of siblings, and BMI. This result indicates that some children do not hesitate to cheat if
they have a chance to do so. On the other hand, it would be convenient to always report
white since nobody controls the result of the toss. The percentage we observe is however
statistically below 100% in every group. This suggests that a non-negligible number of
children receive internal rewards from being honest. Comparing the sub-groups with a two-
sample parametric test (last column of Table 2), we nd moderate evidence signicant at
10% that the proportion of those reporting white is lower in younger children and in those
without siblings.
Table 2. Percentage of reported white outcomes in the experiments
% White (1) Obs. % White (2) Obs. H0: (2) = (1)
Age: 8 or younger older than 8
72.83 92 81.11 90 1.3263*
(62.55, 81.58) (71.49, 88.59) [0.0924]
Gender: Girls Boys
70.59 51 79.39 131 1.2656
(56.17, 82.51) (71.45, 85.96) [0.1028]
School performance: Good or fair Excellent
76.42 106 77.63 76 0.1921
(67.18, 84.12) (66.62, 86.40) [0.4238]
Siblings: No siblings One or more
70.46 44 80.17 116 1.3144*
54.80, 83.24) (71.75, 87.00) [0.0944]
BMI: Bottom 50% Top 50%
76.71 73 77.47 71 0.1074
(65.35, 85.81) (66.00, 86.54) [0.4572]
Note: 95% binom ial condence interval in round brackets; p -value in square brackets. The last co lumn rep orts a two-sample param etric
test of equality of the prop ortions (2) and (1). A lternative hypothesis: (2) < (1). * = sign icant at 10% . For age we use 8 as a cuto¤
to have two sub-groups roughly equal in size.
We then focus on the e¤ect of the RT (Table 3).
Result 2. Telling children not to cheat signicantly reduces the proportion of white
outcomes. The e¤ect is observed uniformly in any sub-group based on age, gender, school
performance, number of siblings, and BMI.
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Table 3. Reminder treatment e¤ect
CT sample RT sample H0: (1) = (2)
% White (1) Obs. % White (2) Obs.
Whole sample 85.39 89 68.82 93 2.6532***
(76.32, 91.99) (58.37, 78.02) [0.0040]
Children aged 8 or below 82.86 35 66.67 57 1.6948**
(66.35, 93.44) (52.94, 78.60) [0.0451]
Children aged more than 8 87.04 54 72.22 36 1.7591**
(75.10, 94.63) (54.81, 85.80) [0.0393]
Girls 83.33 24 59.26 27 1.8833**
(62.62, 95.26) (38.80, 77.61) [0.0298]
Boys 86.15 65 72.73 66 1.8895**
(75.34, 93.47) (60.36, 82.97) [0.0288]
Good or fair at school 85.11 47 69.49 59 1.8813**
(71.69, 93.80) (56.13, 82.61) [0.0300]
Excellent at school 85.71 42 67.65 34 1.8794**
(71.46, 94.57) (49.47, 82.61) [0.0301]
Without siblings 80.95 21 60.87 23 1.4584*
(58.09, 94.55) (38.54, 80.29) [0.0724]
With siblings 88.33 60 71.43 56 2.2819**
(77.43, 95.18) (57.79, 82.70) [0.0112]
Bottom 50% BMI 84.85 33 70.00 40 1.4939*
(68.10, 94.89) (53.47, 83.44) [0.0676]
Top 50% BMI 84.78 46 64.00 25 2.0019**
(71.13, 93.66) (42.52, 82.03) [0.0226]
Note: 95% binom ial condence interval in round brackets; p -value in square brackets. The last co lumn rep orts a two-sample param etric
test of equality of the prop ortions (1) and (2). A lternative hypothesis: (1) < (2). * = sign icant at 10% ; ** = sign icant at 5% ;
*** = sign icant at 1% .
While the percentage of reported whites is always statistically above 50% in the CT
group, in some sub-groups of the RT sample the condence interval includes this proportion.
Indeed, it is only in the RT that we do not nd signicant evidence of cheating behavior in
some sub-groups. Specically, this is the case for girls, children with higher school perfor-
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mance, children without siblings, and children with a high BMI. In the last column of Table
3 we report a two-sample parametric test to compare the proportions (2) and (1) of white
outcomes reported in the CT and RT samples. We nd a generalized negative e¤ect of RT
on the proportion; the e¤ect is signicant at conventional signicance levels, uniformly in
any sub-group.
Finally, we provide a quantitative assessment of the RT e¤ect. In doing so, we control
for all the childs characteristics jointly.
Result 3. The reminder treatment reduces the proportion of white outcomes on average
by 18%. The e¤ect is signicantly larger in girls.
Table 4 shows the marginal e¤ects resulting from two probit regressions where the
dependent variable is a binary variable taking a value 1 if the child reports the white outcome,
and 0 otherwise. In specication (1) this variable is regressed over binary variables on
age groups, gender, school performance, siblings, BMI, and RT e¤ect. If children behaved
uniformly honestly or dishonestly, we should not observe a signicant e¤ect of any variable in
the regression. We indeed see that the childs variables do not explain the reported coin toss
at conventional signicance levels. In particular, we notice that the probability of reporting
white is statistically equal between younger and older children. Only the RT dummy variable
is signicant at 5%. Column (1) shows that simply telling the children not to cheat reduces
the probability of reporting white by 17:96%. In specication (2) we add the interactions
between the RT and the childs characteristics. We nd no evidence of a di¤erent treatment
e¤ect with respect to age, school performance, number of siblings, or BMI, but the e¤ect
seems to be smaller in boys (signicant at 10%). If the probability of reporting white with
the RT is reduced by 35:31% for girls, it is reduced only by 35:31  24:25 = 11:06% for boys.
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Table 4. Probability of reporting the white outcome (marginal e¤ects)
Variable (1) (2)
Age over 8 0.0360 0.0319
(0.0750) (0.1064)
Boy 0.0307 -0.1199
(0.0811) (0.1057)
Better at school -0.0761 -0.0642
(0.0738) (0.1069)
One or more siblings 0.1036 0.1087
(0.0858) (0.1250)
High BMI -0.0527 -0.0410
(0.0749) (0.1081)
RT -0.1796** -0.3531*
(0.0733) (0.2015)
RT*Age over 8 -0.0087
(0.1552)
RT*Boy 0.2425*
(0.1181)
RT*Better at school -0.0185
(0.1519)
RT*One or more siblings -0.0028
(0.1569)
RT*High BMI -0.0384
(0.1615)
N. observations 141 141
Pseudo-R2 0.0657 0.0874
Log-pseudolikelihood -70.5498 -68.9114
Note: M ethod: prob it regression . Dep endent variab le: b inary variab le equal to 1 if the ch ild rep orts the white outcom e, and 0 otherw ise.
Standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations in the regression , 141, is lower than the number of ch ildren who tossed
the coin , 182, as in several cases parents d id not give in formation about one or more of their ch ilds characteristics. * = sign icant at 10% ;
** = sign icant at 5% .
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III. Discussion
Our results show that, even from an early age, some children have an inclination to cheat
when given the opportunity to do so. The result that dishonesty develops early in childhood
is crucial for a society interested in reducing it. The fact that some children in our experiment
reported the (losing) black outcome also shows that there may be an internal reward from
being honest, as suggested by Frank (1987) and Levitt (2006). It seems however that most
children do not receive such internal rewards. This result is consistent with the ndings in
Pruckner and Sausgruber (2008). Finally our analysis suggests that a powerful method to
encourage honesty is simply to remind people to behave correctly. While this action does not
entirely remove the problem, it signicantly reduces the probability of cheating at virtually
no cost. A similar result is found with older subjects in recent works from Mazar, Amir and
Ariely (2007). We nd that a reminder treatment is more e¤ective in females than in males.
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1In our experiment, children either tell the truth or lie. For sake of clarity we do not
permit a mixed behavior as in Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2007), where individuals are allowed
to lie "a little".
2Refer to the appendix for a description of the CUS activities and for pictures.
3We use gender, age, weight and height to calculate the BMI.
4Among the 242 parents we contacted, 203 gave their consent, but 9 of the children were
absent in the two days of the experiment. 12 of the remaining 194 children attended both
sessions; in the second day we took them apart and asked to comment on their and others
previous outcome. None of the children claimed to have cheated in the rst game, but some
said that others might have done so.
5We are skeptical only on the accuracy of reported performance at school. Our impres-
sion is that parents over-rated the performance of their children: around 42% of the sample
reported an "excellent" performance, a similar fraction a "good" performance, and the re-
maining a "fair" performance. Nobody instead reported a "poor" performance. This is
however not a problem for us, as we are interested only in creating a ranking of the school
performance.
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A.1 Timeline 
Our procedure comprises three phases: the authorization, the experiment, and the reward. The 
first phase is conducted one week before the experiment, and consists of asking the parents of 
the children to read, fill in, and sign an authorization form. The form includes basic 
information on the child participating in the experiment: age, gender, school performance, 
number of siblings, height, and weight. 
 
The second phase is the experiment itself, which was conducted on two Thursdays, the 3rd and 
24th of July, in 2008, with multiple sessions for different groups of children between 9:00am 
and 5:30pm. 
 
The reward phase occurs after the experiment has concluded. At the end of each session, the 
management of the summer camp is informed on the rewards, and permits its clubhouse to 
distribute the prizes to the children. Since the children were not allowed to collect their prizes 
without an adult, most of the distribution occurred the day after the experiment. 
16 
 
A.2 Instructions (script, translated from Italian) 
Stage 1: Greeting and introductory instructions for the group (5-10 minutes). 
Hello everybody!  
 
First of all, thanks a lot for letting us come to your summer camp today. It’s really nice to be 
here. Do you like the summer camp? It is your first time? (We asked other questions, just to 
familiarize ourselves with children). 
 
Today you have the opportunity to play a game. This game is easy and we hope also fun. It 
gives you the chance to win some tokens, which you can exchange at the end of the day for 
candies, ice cream, or sodas at the clubhouse of CUS. Everybody can win something, but the 
more carefully you will listen to our instructions, the more tokens you will win. So, please do 
not talk, and try to listen what we will tell you over the next few minutes. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand, and we will be happy to answer you. 
 
The object of the game is to toss this coin and to report us the outcome. According to the 
outcome you can receive 0 or 5 tokens. As I said before, you can exchange your tokens with 
what you want at the clubhouse of CUS. 
 
Questions? Does anyone need to go to the toilet?  
 
Let’s start the game then. 
Stage 2: Identification (5-10 minutes) 
Since this is our first time here, and we do not know your name, we need to give you a tag 
with a number on it, which is on a string that you can wear around your neck. The number on 
the tag has no meaning. However, please keep it always with you, because we will record 
your result using this number, and we will only give tokens to the children that return the 
number tag when the game is over. 
 
Here we have a plastic bag with some cards. Each card has a number. My helper is going to 
come by, and you can pick a card. Once you have a number, you have to go to that table, say 
your name and then get your tag with the same number. During the game, we will use these 
numbers to identify you, since we do not know your names. 
 
The assistants assign a tag to each child whose name is in the list of approved participants, 
corresponding to the number drawn. Once everybody has a tag, we continue with individual 
instructions. 
 
 
 
Stage 3: Game explanation (individually) 
 
Please listen to me carefully. This coin has two sides: one black and one white. Now, you 
have to go behind the wall over there and toss once this coin. Then, you have to report the 
17 
 
outcome using this report sheet. Nobody will see the outcome of your toss. You will receive 5 
tokens if you report white.  Is it clear? 
 
Children in RT were also said the following: 
 
Remember do not cheat! 
 
 
We ask some questions, to check the children’s comprehension of the task, and the payoff 
implications. We answer their questions, or requests to repeat part of the instructions.  
 
 
 
Stage 4: Game playing (individually) 
 
 
Children go individually behind the wall, toss the coin and fill in the report sheet. Then they 
return us the report sheet. Only then we repeat this procedure with another child. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 5: Farewells (10 minutes) 
 
Thank you very much guys. You really did a great job. Now, to thank you we have a surprise. 
There are some sodas, juices and water for you. Come on, follow us and enjoy! 
 
 
When saying farewell to the children, they are provided with some beverages. This was 
expressly requested by the management of the summer camp, to ensure a “prize” of some sort 
for all the children, even those who reported the black outcome. 
 
In the mean time assistants prepare the bonuses with their corresponding tokens. 
 
Ok, the game is now over; please return us the tag. After 5:30 this evening you can get a 
certificate showing the number of tokens you won. You can get your rewards at the clubhouse 
whenever you want, provided that you come with an adult. 
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A.3 Material 
The material used in the experiment is summarized by the pictures below. 
 
A.3.1 Authorization form   
The authorization form consists of four pages, as shown below. After the title page, the first 
page contains information about us, and the second is where the parents fill in authorization 
information (age, gender, school performance, number of siblings, height, and weight). The 
last page explains the game. 
 
  
 
 
A.3.2 Coin  
In our experiment, we used a coin like this: 
 
A.3.3 Reporting sheets 
 
a) Control Treatment;                             b) Reminder Treatment 
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A.3.4 Certificate 
 
At the end of the day we give each child a certificate (see below) showing the number of 
tokens he or she won. If he or she comes to the clubhouse with an adult, this certificate can be 
used to get rewards. 
 
 
 
 
 
A.4 Rewards 
The reward phase occurs after the experiment has concluded. At the end of each session, the 
management of the summer camp is informed on the rewards, and permits its clubhouse to 
distribute the prizes to the children. Since the children were not allowed to collect their prizes 
without an adult, most of the distribution occurred the day after the experiment. 
The clubhouse is very well supplied. Examples of what it is possible to buy inside it are: 
assorted ice cream, assorted candies, sodas (water, iced tea, Cola and other soft drinks), juices 
(pear, peach, pineapple, apricot, etc.) milk and coffee, assorted chips, cookies, croissants and 
muffins. 
 
We agreed with the management of the summer camp to exchange 1 token with 10 eurocents. 
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A.5 Supplementary information on the CUS activities 
The "Centro Universitario Sportivo" (CUS) is a non-professional sport center created in the 
40s to promote sport activities free of charge among the students of the Italian universities. In 
the past CUS athletes have often succeeded in national and international competitions, have 
won medals at the Olympic Games, and have set new Italian records. Every major Italian 
university manages its own center. Among others, the University of Padua currently counts 
around 60,000 students regularly enrolled in the various courses of its 13 faculties. The 
university owns two sport grounds located near the city walls. The main sport ground, where 
we ran the experiment, covers 70,000 square meters and includes facilities for playing 
athletics, field hockey, Greco-Roman wrestling, rugby, soccer, jogging, body building and 
tennis. 
Besides its main purpose, the CUS has recently given more attention to children and young 
adults. The CUS of Padua has administered a summer camp since 1993. The summer camp 
covers 12 weeks from June to September, with a break in the middle of August. Enrollment is 
open to all children aged 15 or less, and costs between 95 and 110 Euros per week (depending 
on the week chosen). The fee allows taking part in all the activities organized by the summer 
camp, from Monday to Friday, 9.00 AM to 5.30 PM, with some breaks for snacks and lunch 
(offered by the CUS). The number of children enrolled in an average week of July is 120, 
with age mostly concentrated between 6 and 12. At the beginning of the week, children are 
divided in six groups of around 20 units each, roughly homogeneous in age; occasionally a 
special group is created for children in pre-scholar age. A highly-qualified instructor assists 
each group in the activities. Typical activities are athletics, judo, mini-volleyball, mini-
basketball, rugby, soccer, but there is also room for chess, drawing, theater etc. 
 
 
